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1 Introduction
Should money be exempted from taxation? Initially, two contrasting answers
were given to this question. One was provided by Friedman (1969), who
claimed, from a normative standpoint, that the inflation tax —the nominal
interest rate— should be brought to zero, when lump-sum taxes are available.
Money should be tax free because the marginal private cost of holding money
(that is, the nominal interest rate) should be equated to the marginal social
cost of money, which is zero as money is costless to produce. The Fried-
man rule is a first-best monetary policy prescription obtained in a partial
equilibrium setup.1
A second answer was given, in a diﬀerent direction, by Phelps (1973).
On the basis of the Ramsey (1927) optimal diﬀerential-tax analysis, Phelps
argued that, when lump-sum taxes are not available and a prescribed amount
of revenue has to be raised by using distortionary taxes, it is socially optimal
to tax money — that is, to set a positive nominal interest rate — in addition
to all other goods.
Economics scholars have widely studied the issue of the optimal inflation
tax, since the appearance of the Friedman (1969) and Phelps (1973) seminal
contributions. See Woodford (1990) and Kocherlakota (2005) for compara-
tive analyses of the state of knowledge in diﬀerent moments.
Some recent articles, based on dynamic general equilibrium analysis, show
that the optimality of the Friedman rule is a general result, since it is also
satisfied in a second-best world when distortionary income or consumption
taxes are used to finance an exogenous flow of government spending. This is
demonstrated in intertemporal optimizing models with infinite-lived agents,
endogenous labor-leisure choices and flexible prices, for example, by Kim-
brough (1986), Faig (1988), Guidotti and Vegh (1993), Chari, Christiano
and Kehoe (1996), Correia and Teles (1996, 1999), and De Fiore and Teles
(2003).
Kimbrough (1986) obtains that the optimal monetary policy is the Fried-
1It must be acknowledged that considerations on the ineﬃciency of a positive inflation
tax have been made ante litteram by Bailey (1956) and, through the development of a
formal model, Samuelson (1968).
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man rule when the shopping-time technology is constant returns to scale.
Correia and Teles (1996) generalize the zero inflation tax result to any ho-
mogeneous transaction costs technology. Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1996)
show that such a policy rule holds in three monetary models — the cash-in-
advance model based on the distinction between cash goods and credit goods,
the money in the utility function model and the shopping-time cost model
— when conditions on separability and homotheticity of preferences are sat-
isfied. Also Correia and Teles (1999) confirm Friedman’s (1969) result when
money enters the utility function. De Fiore and Teles (2003) demonstrate
that the validity of the Friedman policy scheme does not depend on the choice
of the alternative tax instruments that are used to obtain a given amount of
revenue, if the transactions technology —homogeneous of any degree— incor-
porates the plausible assumption that money is unit elastic with respect to
the price level gross of consumption taxes.
Chamley (1985), Faig (1988), Woodford (1990) and Guidotti and Vegh
(1993), instead, discuss some theoretical cases in which the zero seignorage
result is nonoptimal. In a representative agent model of capital formation,
Chamley (1985) argues that the optimal dynamic tax configuration is one in
which money and labor taxes should finance government expenditure. Wood-
ford (1990) underlines the fact that if consumption and money are gross sub-
stitutes, the optimal inflation tax is diﬀerent from zero. Guidotti and Vegh
(1993) show that the optimal inflation tax is zero under income taxation, but
may be positive under consumption taxation, when the shopping-time cost
function is constant returns to scale; if, instead, the transaction technology
is not constant returns to scale, the Friedman rule is invalid under either
consumption or income taxation.
Two justifications have been provided for the optimality of the zero in-
flation tax in a world with distortionary taxes. One is based on the classic
principle of public finance on production eﬃciency established by Diamond
and Mirrlees (1971). According to this principle, when the production func-
tion is constant returns to scale, intermediate goods should be exempted from
taxation as taxes are levied only on final goods. As money is an intermediate
input in economies with a transaction technology, the optimal inflation tax
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has to be zero to preserve production eﬃciency.2 If money enters the utility
function à la Sidrauski and preferences are homothetic in money and con-
sumption as well as separable in leisure, the Friedman ”full liquidity” rule is
satisfied because such an economy is equivalent to one with a transactions
technology.3 When the cash-credit goods model, developed by Lucas and
Stokey (1983), is considered, the Friedman rule derives from the Atkinson
and Stiglitz (1972) principle of uniform taxation of all types of consumption
goods (which follows from the intermediate goods result). In this case, a
zero inflation tax ensures the optimal tax treatment of cash goods relative
to credit goods.
A second justification, alternative to the first one, follows from the as-
sumption that money is a free good. Also in a second-best world (like in the
first-best case considered by Friedman, 1969), it is the zero marginal cost of
producing money that implies a zero opportunity cost of holding money, i.e.
zero inflation tax, to guarantee eﬃciency. Correia and Teles (1996, 1999),
and De Fiore and Teles (2003) show that the Friedman rule is nonoptimal
when money is no longer a free primary input (that is, the production of
money requires labor as an input).
The zero inflation tax result is criticized on a systematic basis by Mulli-
gan and Sala-i-Martin (1997), who make a comparative investigation of the
scattered results of the literature based on infinite horizons and flexible prices
by using a unified framework that embodies previous models and results as
particular cases. They show that the optimality of the Friedman rule is frag-
ile as its validity, far from being general, strictly depends on the assumptions
adopted on the utility functions and/or the shopping-time technology; these
assumptions concern, for example, the absence of the scale elasticity in the
money demand and the fact that some taxes could be paid or not by using
money.
2See, for example, Kimbrough (1986), Guidotti and Vegh (1993), Chari, Christiano and
Kehoe (1996), and Chari and Kehoe (1999).
3See Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1996), and, for the generalization of such a result,
Correia and Teles (1999). However, if the preference conditions were not satisfied, the
equivalence (in terms of the optimal inflation tax analysis) of the money in the utility
function model with the shopping-time one would be questionable (see Mulligan and Sala-
i-Martin, 1997).
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Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (2004a) find that the consideration of firms with
market power may invalidate the optimality of the zero seignorage result in a
stochastic model with pecuniary shopping-costs and no capital; in particular,
they show that the Friedman rule is invalid if dividends, which exert only
income eﬀects, cannot be taxed at the optimal 100% rate.
The implications of other environmental conditions for the Friedmanmon-
etary policy —like, for example, OLG demographics, agent heterogeneity, and
price rigidity— have been studied, among many others, by Abel (1987), Gah-
vari (1988), Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (2004b), Bhattacharya, Haslag and
Martin (2005), Lagos and Wright (2005), and Correia, Nicolini and Teles
(2008).4
In this paper, we investigate the question of the optimal inflation tax
through infinitely-lived models of capital formation with flexible prices and
distortionary capital and labor income taxes.5 In order to avoid that the
paper results might depend on the properties of preferences or technologies
for producing transaction services (whose role has been discussed in details
by Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin, 1997), a shopping-time model with a homo-
geneous transaction cost technology (that generally supports the Friedman
rule in standard setups) is employed purposefully.
We characterize cases, new in the literature, in which it is optimal to
tax money in addition to factors of production in order to finance a fixed
stream of public spending. The Phelps (1973) prescription on the second-
best monetary policy is valid when there are restrictions on taxation; that is,
when there are factors of production, monopoly profits or rents that cannot
be taxed optimally. We show that in general the hypotheses that violate
4See Kocherlakota (2005) for a selective review of the recent literature highlighting the
role of such contexts.
5To the best of my knowledge, the role of the capital stock for the optimal taxation of
money has only been studied by Chamley (1985), who, however, did not consider capital
taxation. In the literature on the Friedman rule, the inflation tax is always considered
together with consumption and/or labor income taxes. In models in which labor is the
unique factor of production and there are infinite horizons, consumption taxation and labor
taxation are de facto equivalent. This correspondence does not hold when consumption
taxes are paid with money (that is, consumption expenditure, instead of consumption,
enters the transaction technology) as supposed, for example, by Kimbrough (1986) and
Guidotti and Vegh (1993); see Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997).
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the Friedman rule also lead to the nonoptimality of the Judd (1985) and
Chamley (1986) result on the zero capital income taxation.
In economies in which firms have market power or there are decreasing
returns to scale in the reproducible factors, for example, the optimality of
the zero inflation tax is valid if either capital and profits/rents are taxed
at the same optimally chosen rate or profits/rents are taxed at the 100%
rate. If profits are taxed less than capital income, the normative analysis
suggests that collecting some revenue from seignorage is optimal. These
findings generalize and extend the result of Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (2004a),
who instead show that the Friedman rule is satisfied only if fiscal confiscation
of monopoly profits is permitted.
Limitations on tax setting imply that the social planner has to take into
account further constraints (in addition to the implementability and feasi-
bility constraints) when choosing the Ramsey allocation. This fact results in
an optimal inflation tax that is diﬀerent from zero.
In models in which the marginal cost of producing money is zero, we ob-
tain that the optimality of the Friedman rule is denied because the Diamond
and Mirrlees (1971) principle of tax exemption of intermediate goods —that
also supports the zero capital income tax result— is violated.6 This observa-
tion is consistent with Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971), and Munk (1980), who
argue that production eﬃciency is undermined by the existence of profits or
the impossibility of setting taxation at an optimal level for some goods.
Finally, as a particular case, we show that the consideration of exogenous
government transfers received by consumers, in an intertemporal optimizing
growth model with infinite horizons, results in a positive optimal inflation tax
and a zero optimal capital income tax. This result stems from the fact that
government transfers have to be expressed in terms of consumption relative
prices (and hence multiplied by a function of real money balances) when
included in the implementability constraint.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 investigates the optimal
monetary policy in a perfectly competitive economy when it is not possible to
6In the normative analysis of dynamic capital taxation, the role of restrictions on the
set of the available tax instruments is studied by Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993, 1997),
and Correia (1996).
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tax some inputs. Section 3 presents a monetary model with monopolistically
competitive firms and analyzes the normative properties of money and factor
income taxation. Section 4 examines the case of profits/rents in a competitive
economy with non-reproducible inputs. In Section 5, the implications of fixed
government transfers for the inflation tax are discussed. Section 6 concludes.
2 Perfect competition and tax restrictions
2.1 The model
Consider a monetary economy, defined in continuous time, in which there are
infinite-lived consumers and perfectly competitive firms. In this economy,
output is produced by using physical capital k, labor l, and a third factor of
production z, that cannot be taxed or subsidized.7 The supply of z is elastic.
The production technology is given by y = F (k, l, z), which is regular in
a neoclassical sense and linearly homogeneous in the three inputs. Maximum
profit requires that factors of production are paid their marginal products;
that is,
Fk(k, l, z) = r, (1a)
Fl(k, l, z) = w, (1b)
Fz(k, l, z) = v, (1c)
where r is the real rental on capital, w the real wage and v the price (in real
terms) of z.
Consumers, whose number remains constant over time, maximize the
integral utility
7We do not give a precise interpretation to z and leave it undefined so that diﬀerent
particular cases can be considered.
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? ∞
0
U(c, x, s)e−ρtdt, (2)
where c is consumption, x leisure, s =z −z, z the exogenous endowment of
z and ρ the fixed rate of time preference. The instantaneous utility function
U( · ) is strictly increasing and concave in its arguments. c, x and s are
assumed to be normal goods.
Transactions required for consumption need time. Money balances facil-
itate transactions by reducing the amount of shopping time e. The amount
of time employed in transactions is described by the technology
e = T (c,m) = chq(
m
c
), (3)
where m =
M
p
denotes real money balances, M the nominal money stock
and p the output price. T ( · ), which is homogeneous of degree h O 0 in
c and m, satisfies the properties: Tc O 0, Tm  0, Tcc > 0, Tmm > 0 and
Tcm < 0.8 The function q(
m
c
) =
e
ch
has the properties: q  0 and q > 0.
When Tm = q = 0, the money-consumption ratio is constant and equal to
γ∗ =
? c
m
?∗
, which corresponds to the satiation level of real money balances.9
The fixed time endowment, normalized to one, is used for consuming
leisure, working and making transactions; that is,
1 = x+ l + e. (4)
8While Tcc > 0 and Tmm > 0 guarantee the convexity of the transactions cost tech-
nology and the fact that the use of money has diminishing returns, Tcm < 0, instead,
ensures a positive scale elasticity (i.e., a positive eﬀect of consumption on the demand
for money). Tcm < 0 follows from the signs of the other partial derivatives of T ( · ).
In fact, by using the homogeneity of degree h of T ( · ), it can be easily verified that
Tcm = −
[(1− h)Tm +mTmm]
c
= − [(1− h)Tc + cTcc]
m
< 0.
9A plausible functional form for q( · ) is given by q(m
c
) = Q
m
c
? c
m
− γ∗
?2
, where Q is
a positive constant. This functional form comes from Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997)
when the homogeneity of degree zero of q( · ) is imposed. If h = γ∗ = 0, the Baumol-Tobin
inventory model is obtained.
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Consumers accumulate wealth by holding capital, money and government
bonds b, which are perfectly substitutable with capital. The intertemporal
budget constraint of consumers — obtained by integrating their flow budget
constraint forward and incorporating the condition precluding Ponzi games
— is described by
? ∞
0
[c+ im− (1− τ l)wl − vz]e−
? t
0 (1−τk)rdudt = k0 + a0, (5)
where i = (1−τk)r+π represents the nominal interest rate, i.e. the after-tax
real interest rate plus the inflation rate π, τ l the ad valorem labor income tax
rate, τk the ad valorem capital income tax rate, k0 + a0 nonhuman wealth
a time 0, and a0 = b0 + m0 (where b0 and m0 are the stock of goverment
bonds and money balances in real terms at time 0, respectively). a0 is set
equal to zero without any loss of generality. The hypothesis that z is un-
taxed/unsubsidized has been considered in (5).
The maximization of (2) subject to (3), (4) and (5) yields the following
first-order conditions10
Uce−ρt = [1 + (1− τ l)wTc]λe−
? t
0 (1−τk)rdu, (6a)
Uxe−ρt = (1− τ l)wλe−
? t
0 (1−τk)rdu, (6b)
Use−ρt = vλe−
? t
0 (1−τk)rdu, (6c)
−(1− τ l)wTm = i, (6d)
10The way in which the solution of this optimal dynamic problem is specified follows,
mutatis mutandis, from Lucas (1990). Such a specification is preparatory for the normative
analysis of taxation, based on the Lucas and Stokey (1983) methodology, developed below.
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where λ = Uc[c(0), x(0)] = Uc[0] is the Lagrange multiplier on the intertem-
poral budget constraint (5) at time 0. From equation (6a), the Euler equation
for the ”Keynes-Ramsey rule” is obtained
ρ− d
dt
ln
?
Uc
[1 + (1− τ l)wTc]
?
= (1− τk)r. (6e)
Equation (6b), which can be written, after using (6a), as
Ux
Uc
=
(1− τ l)w
[1 + (1− τ l)wTc]
,
asserts that the marginal rate of substitution of consumption for leisure must
equal the opportunity cost of leisure in terms of consumption; this opportu-
nity cost is equal to the after-tax wage divided by the price of consumption,
i.e., one plus the marginal-time cost of consumption (measured in terms of
the take-home wage). A similar eﬃciency condition is obtained by combining
(6c) and (6a); that is,
Us
Uc
=
v
[1 + (1− τ l)wTc]
. Equation (6d) describes the
demand for real money balances in implicit terms. Equation (6e) ensures
that, in the intertemporal equilibrium, the rate of return on consumption
—i.e., the LHS— is equal to the after-tax return on nonhuman wealth, namely,
the after-tax real interest rate.
The resource constraint states that output is equal to aggregate demand:
F (k, l, z) = c+
.
k +g. (7)
The government finances the budget deficit by issuing public debt and
money. The government budget constraint is given by
.
b +
.
m= (1− τk)r(b+m) + g − (τkrk + τ lwl + im). (8)
2.2 Optimal policy analysis
The problem of the eﬃcient tax policy, known as the ’Ramsey problem’,
prescribes that the utility of the representative consumer is maximized by
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taking into account the competitive equilibrium with distortionary taxes and
the constraint that a given amount of revenue has to be raised.
We study the Ramsey problem by using the ’primal method’ to optimal
taxation in the version developed by Lucas and Stokey (1983). This method
employs the implementability constraint, obtained from the households’ in-
tertemporal budget constraint by expressing prices and taxes in terms of
quantities through the marginal eﬃciency conditions of consumers (6).
Plugging the following relationships
(1− τ l)w =
Uxe−ρt
λe−
? t
0 (1−τk)rdu
=
Ux
(Uc − UxTc)
and
v =
Use−ρt
λe−
? t
0 (1−τk)rdu
=
Us
(Uc − UxTc)
—obtained by combining (6a), (6b) and (6c)— and λ = Uc[0] into (5), one
obtains, after using the property of homogeneity of degree h of T ( · ) and
rearranging, the implementability constraint; that is,
? ∞
0
{cUc − Ux[1− x− (1− h)T ]− zUs}e−ρtdt = λk0. (9)
As it is not possible to tax z, the complete characterization of the Ram-
sey problem has to take into account the private eﬃciency conditions (from
both the consumer and firm standpoints) for factor z —otherwise the com-
petitive equilibrium cannot be decentralized. Such a condition is given by
Us
(Uc − UxTc)
= Fz, obtained from (1c), (6a), (6b) and (6c).
Define the pseudo-welfare function of the social planner as
W (c, x, z,m, k,Φ) = U(c, x, z −z) + Φ{cUc − Ux[1− x− (1− h)T ]− zUs},
where Φ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (7) and T = T (c,m). Φ
is positive because taxes are distortionary.
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The second-best problem can be formulated in a formal and compact way
as follows:
max
? ∞
0
W (c, x, z,m, k,Φ)e−ρtdt (10a)
subject to
.
k= F [k, 1− x− T (c,m), z]− c− g, (10b)
Us = Fz(Uc − UxTc). (10c)
We show that
Proposition 1 When there are restrictions on the taxation of (at least) one
factor of production, the optimal inflation tax is positive, while the optimal
capital income tax may be positive, negative or zero depending on whether
capital and the untaxed input are complements, substitutes or independent.
Proof. The ’Ramsey optimum’ requires the satisfaction of the following
first-order conditions
Wc = Γ(1 + FlTc)−∆A, (11a)
Wx = ΓFl −∆B, (11b)
Ws = ΓFz −∆D, (11c)
ΦUx(1− h)Tm = [ΓFl −∆(Uc − UxTc)Fzl]Tm −∆UxFzTcm, (11d)
12
−
.
Γ +Γρ = ΓFk −∆(Uc − UxTc)Fzk, (11e)
where
Wc ≡ Uc[1 + Φ(1 + εc)], (12a)
Wx ≡ Ux[1 + Φ(1 + εx)], (12b)
Ws ≡ Us[1 + Φ(1 + εs)]. (12c)
Γ and ∆ represent the Lagrange multipliers on (10b) and (10c), respectively.
A, B and D are parameter combinations.11 εc, εx and εs are general equilib-
rium elasticities for consumption, leisure and z, respectively.12
If (10c) were not imposed as a constraint of the planner problem, the
optimal Ramsey plan would yield the following relationship as a first-order
condition for z
Us[1 + Φ(1 + εs)]
{Uc[1 + Φ(1 + εc)]− Ux[1 + Φ(1 + εx)]Tc} = Fz,
which is clearly incompatible with (10c).
With the aid of (11b), the Ramsey condition for money (11d) can be
written as
11These parameter combinations are given by
A = Usc − Fz(Ucc − UxTcc − TcUxc) + (Uc − UxTc)TcFzl];
B = Usx−Fz(Ucx−TcUxx)+ (Uc−UxTc)Fzl]; and D = Uss+(Uc−TcUx)Fzz −Fz(Ucs−
TcUxs).
12The expressions for these elasticities are
εc =
cUcc
Uc
− (l + hT )Uxc
Uc
+
Ux
Uc
(1− h)Tc − z
Usc
Uc
;
εx =
cUcx
Ux
− (l + hT )Uxx
Ux
− zUsx
Ux
; and εs =
cUcs
Us
− (l + hT )Uxs
Us
− zUss
Us
.
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{Ux + Φ(h+ εx)Ux +∆[Usx − Fz(Ucx − TcUxx)]}Tm = ∆FzUxTcm.
By plugging (6d) into this equation it yields the optimal inflation rate
i∗ = − ∆FzU
2
xTcm(Uc − UxTc)−1
{Ux + Φ(h+ εx)Ux +∆[Usx − Fz(Ucx − TcUxx)]} > 0. (13a)
As Tcm < 0, and ∆ and the denominator of (13a) are positive, the op-
timal monetary policy is the Phelps (1973) rule, thus making it necessary
to set a positive inflation tax. This anti-Friedman result derives from the
impossibility of taxing z optimally, i.e. ∆ > 0.
In the long-run, by substituting the ’modified golden rule’, derived from
(6e) —i.e., ρ = (1− τk)Fk— into (11e), the optimal capital income tax rate is
obtained; this is given by
τ ∗k =
∆
Γ
(Uc − UxTc)Fzk
Fk
≷ 0. (13b)
It is optimal to tax (subsidize) capital income if capital and the untaxed
input are Edgeworth complementary (substitutable) — that is, Fzk > (<) 0.
If k and z are independent, i.e. Fzk = 0, the Chamley-Judd result (that is,
τ ∗k = 0) is obtained.
The optimal labor tax rate —derived by constrasting the optimal condi-
tions for the private and Ramsey problems regarding c and x— is given by
τ ∗l =
[UcUxΦ(εx − εc) +∆(UcB − UxA)]
(Uc − UxTc)(Wx +∆B)
. (13c)
τ ∗l is positive for plausible parameter values.
13?
13The optimal labor tax can be equivalently be expressed as
τ∗l =
[(Uc − UxTc)(Wc +A)− UcΓ]
Tc(Uc − UxTc)(Wx +∆B)
. (13c’)
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If a factor of production cannot be taxed, the minimizaton of the excess
burden of taxation requires to optimally distribute taxation over money and
incomes from taxable inputs. Our discoveries would remain valid if z were
taxed, but not at an optimal rate.
In a context in which the tax code is not suﬃciently rich, the inflation
tax represents an indirect way of taxing the untaxable inputs.14 If there were
no restrictions on the taxation of factor z, i.e. ∆ = 0, the optimal taxes on
money and capital income would be both zero.
This result extends the operative validity of the Phelps (1973) intuition
to an intertemporal optimizing model of capital accumulation with factor
income taxation and tax restrictions.
The economic ratio of the optimal tax configuration discovered here is
imputable to the invalidity of the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) intermediate
good result when there are limitations to the optimal tax setting, as has been
demonstrated by Munk (1980). The mechanical motivation of our results,
instead, is based on the fact that, when additional constraints have to be
imposed on the Ramsey problem, a second partial derivative of the transac-
tions technology enters the first-order condition of the planner problem for
real money balances. This is the element that mechanically undermines the
optimality of the Friedman rule.
The simplest application of Proposition 1 is obtained when there are only
two inputs, labor and capital, and two tax instruments, that is, inflation and
capital income taxes. In this case, we get:
Proposition 1.1 In an infinite-lived monetary model with elastic labor-
leisure choices, Ramsey optimality prescribes positive taxation of money and
capital if labor cannot be taxed.
Proof. The optimal condition for real money balances, obtained from (13a),
implies a positive inflation tax. The Ramsey plan for the capital tax rate,
once combined with the private eﬃciency condition (6e), yields (13b) with
Flk that now replaces Fzk; thus, τ ∗k > 0 as Flk > 0, as the production function
is linearly homogeneous in k and l.?
14Our discovery is very similar to what is found by Nicolini (1998) in a model with
tax evasion. In the Nicolini (1998) analysis, the inflation tax serves as a tool to tax the
underground sector, as ’shadow’ transactions are regulated through cash.
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3 Monopolistic competition and taxation of
profits
3.1 The model
Consider an immortal monetary economy in which there are product market
imperfections. The role of monopolistic competition for the validity of the
Friedman rule has been investigated by Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe (2004a),
whose analysis is extended here to include endogenous capital formation, as
well as capital and profit income taxation.
The consideration of firms with market power is based on the supply-
side of the Benhabib and Farmer (1994) analysis. There are two sectors in
the economy: a final good sector, which is perfectly competitive, and an
intermediate good sector, which is monopolistically competitive. The per-
fectly competitive sector produces a unique final good by using diﬀerentiated
intermediate goods. The imperfectly competitive sector, instead, produces
intermediate goods by using physical capital and labor.15
The final good y is produced by using the following linearly homogeneous
production function
y =
?? 1
0
y1−µi di
? 1
1−µ
, (14)
where yi represents the ith intermediate good, and i is continuous in the in-
terval [0,1]; µ " [0, 1) is the reciprocal of the elasticity of substitution among
intermediate inputs. Final good producing firms maximize profits by choos-
ing the optimal quantity of each intermediate good. The first-order condition
for profit maximization yields the following input demand
pi
p
=
?
yi
y
?−µ
, (15)
15Shaw, Chang and Lai (2006) use a similar production structure for the analysis of the
optimal inflation tax. Their analysis, however, diﬀers greatly from ours since they consider
an endogenous growth model with production externalities, a cash-in-advance constraint
and a non-proper Ramsey analysis in which lump-sum transfers adjust endogenously.
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where pi is the price of the ith intermediate good and p the price of the final
good. Since the final sector is perfectly competitive, firms’ profits should be
zero. This requires that p =
?? 1
0
p
µ−1
µ
i di
? µ
µ−1
.
The technology used in the intermediate goods sector is, instead, de-
scribed by
yi = F (ki, li), (16)
where ki and li represent capital and labor used for producing intermediate
good ith, respectively. F ( · ) satisfies the neoclassical properties of regularity
and is constant returns to scale.
If we use (15), the ith firm’s profit in the intermediate sector (measured
in terms of the final good) can be expressed as Πi = yµy
1−µ
i −wli−rki, where
r is the real rental on capital and w the real wage. The ith intermediate good
producer maximizes Πi by taking into account the production function (16).
The first-order conditions for his/her problem are
(1− µ)yµy−µi Fki(ki, li) = r, (17a)
(1− µ)yµy−µi Fli(ki, li) = w. (17b)
We consider a situation of symmetric equilibrium in which ki = k, li = l,
pi = p and yi = y. In this situation, the real rental on capital and the real
wage are given by
(1− µ)Fk(k, l) = r, (17a’)
(1− µ)Fl(k, l) = w. (17b’)
17
Profits in the intermediate good sector profits are positive and equal to
Π = µF (k, l). µ measures the degree of product market imperfections; if
the market power of firms is zero (that is, µ = 0), the competitive case will
obviously be obtained.
The utility function of consumers, defined over the infinite time span, is
? ∞
0
U(c, x)e−ρtdt, (18)
where U( · ) satisfies the usual properties of regularity.
The transaction costs technology and the time allocation constraint are
given by (3) and (4), respectively. The consumers’ intertemporal budget
constraint is
? ∞
0
[c+ im− (1− τ l)wl − (1− ατk)Π]e−
? t
0 (1−τk)rdudt = k0, (19)
where α is a parameter taking alternatively value 0 or 1, and the value of
government bonds and real money balances at time 0 have been set equal to
zero.
Dividends Π enter (19) as consumers are the owners of firms. As profits
exert only income eﬀects,16 their separate optimal taxation would prescribe
a confiscatory 100% rate. Since such an optimal taxation of profits is not
feasible in practice,17 we consider two alternative regimes of profit taxation:
one in which profits are untaxed, and one in which they are taxed at the same
rate as capital income.18 These two polar regimes can be captured through
the dummy α. If α = 0, profits are tax free and only the capital income tax
16This is because profits do not aﬀect the marginal choices of consumers, but they only
enter their disposable income.
17Such an impracticability could be due to many reasons, like, for example, tax authori-
ties that may be unable to distinguish capital income from profit income, agents that may
conceal profits to the fiscal authority, fiscal policy-makers that may not have the political
strength or the political mandate from their voters to implement such a type of taxation.
18Guo and Lansing (1999) consider identical hypotheses for the analysis of the optimal
capital income tax rate.
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rate is chosen optimally; if, instead, α = 1, there is a common tax rate for
capital income and profits, which is set optimally.19
Consumers maximize (18) subject to (3), (4), and (19). The first-order
conditions for the consumer problem are given by (6), with the exception of
(6c), which now does not apply.
The feasibility constraint is given by (7), when y = F (k, l) is used.
3.2 Second-best problem and the Ramsey plan
The Ramsey problem has to be devised in such a way as to realize the pos-
sibility that capital income and profits are taxed at the same rate.
By employing (1− τ l)w =
Uxe−ρt
λe−
? t
0 (1−τk)rdu
=
Ux
ξ
—where ξ = (Uc − UxTc)—
and λ = Uc[0], the implementability constraint can be expressed as
? ∞
0
{cUc − Ux[1− x− (1− h)T ]− (1− ατk)Πξ}e−ρtdt = λk0. (20)
The eﬃcient second-best tax structure is found by maximizing the utility
functional (18) subject to the implementability constraint (20), the feasibility
constraint (7) with F (k, l) and the Euler equation (6e), once the transaction
technology (3), the time allocation constraint (4) and the firms’ demand
for capital (17a’) are taken into account. The additional constraint (6e)
is considered as τk enters the implementability constraint when profits are
subject to taxation (that is, α 9= 0). Equation (6e) can be written as
.
ξ=
ξ[ρ − (1 − τk)r], since, by using (6a) and (6b), it can be easily shown that
Uc
[1 + (1− τ l)wTc]
= (Uc − UxTc) ≡ ξ.
Now the Ramsey problem can be expressed as
max
? ∞
0
W (c, x,m, k, τk,Φ)e−ρtdt (21a)
subject to
19Note that the confiscatory taxation of profits can be obtained when α = 1
τk
.
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.k= F (k, 1− x− T )− c− g, (21b)
.
ξ= ξ[ρ− (1− τk)(1− µ)Fk], (21c)
ξ = (Uc − UxTc), (21d)
where
W (c, x,m, k, τk,Φ) = U(c, x) + Φ{cUc − Ux[1− x− (1− h)T ]− (1− ατk)Πξ},
Φ > 0 is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (20), Π = µF (k, l), and
T = T (c,m).
How is the optimal tax structure characterized?
Our findings can be synthesized as follows
Proposition 2 In a monopolistically competitive monetary model of capital
formation, in which the confiscatory taxation of profits is not praticable, the
eﬃcient tax structure requires to tax labor and money, and to subsidize capital
if profits cannot be taxed. If capital income and profits are taxed equally,
optimality calls for positive capital and labor tax rates and a zero inflation
tax.
Proof. The first-order conditions for the Ramsey problem are
Wc = Γ(1 + FlTc)− Ωξ(1− τk)(1− µ)FklTc +∆(Ucc − UxTcc − TcUxc),
(22a)
Wx = ΓFl − Ωξ(1− τk)(1− µ)Fkl +∆(Ucx − TcUxx), (22b)
20
Wm = [ΓFl − Ωξ(1− τk)(1− µ)Fkl]Tm −∆UxTcm, (22c)
−
.
Γ +Γρ = −Φξ(1− ατk)Πk + ΓFk − Ωξ(1− τk)(1− µ)Fkk, (22d)
−
.
Ω +ρΩ = −Φ(1− ατk)Π+ Ω[ρ− (1− τk)(1− µ)Fk] +∆, (22e)
Ω = − αΦΠ
(1− µ)Fk
, (22f)
where
Wc ≡ Uc[1 + Φ(1 + ηc)] + Φξ(1− ατk)ΠlTc, (23a)
Wx ≡ Ux[1 + Φ(1 + ηx)] + Φξ(1− ατk)Πl, (23b)
Wm ≡ Φ[Ux(1− h) + ξ(1− ατk)Πl]Tm, (23c)
where Πj = µFj for j = k, l. Γ, Ω, and ∆ are Lagrange multipliers on
(21b), (21c) and (21d), respectively; ηc and ηx represent general equilibrium
elasticities for consumption and leisure, respectively.20
In the steady state equilibrium, it can be easily obtained, by combining
(22e) and (22f), that ∆ = (1− α)ΦµF .
The optimal condition for real money balances (22c) can be expressed
—after using (22b), (23), and the previous expression for ∆— as
20These elasticities are defined as
ηc =
cUcc
Uc
− (l + hT )Uxc
Uc
+
Ux
Uc
(1− h)Tc; and ηx =
cUcx
Ux
− (l + hT )Uxx
Ux
.
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{Ux[1 + Φ(ηx + h)]− (1− α)ΠΦ(Ucx − TcUxx)}Tm = (1− α)ΦΠUxTcm.
By using (6c), the optimal inflation rate is
i∗ = − (1− α)ΦΠU
2
xTcm(Uc − UxTc)−1
{Ux[1 + Φ(ηx + h)]− (1− α)ΠΦ(Ucx − TcUxx)}
O 0. (24a)
Second-best optimality requires that i∗ > 0 if α = 0. Therefore, when
profits are taxed less than capital income (α < 1), the optimal monetary
policy satisfies the Phelps (1973) rule. If, instead, capital income and profits
are taxed at the same rate (i.e., α = 1), the Friedman rule is optimal.
The joint use of (17a’) and (6e) implies that, in the steady state, (1 −
τk)(1 − µ)Fk = ρ. Employing this equation together with (22d) and (22f)
yields the following optimal capital income tax rate
τ ∗k = −
µ[Γ− Φξ(1− αFFkk
F 2k
)]
[Γ(1− µ) + αΦµξ(1− FFkk
F 2k
)]
. (24b)
The sign of the optimal capital income tax is ambiguous.21 If α = 0, τ ∗k < 0
as Γ−Φξ = ξ+Φ(Ucηc− UxηxTc) > 0. In this case, capital taxation alleviates
the distortionary role of market imperfections as suggested by Judd (2002).
If instead α = 1, τ ∗k > 0 since the profit tax rate, constrained to be equal to
the capital income tax rate, exerts only income eﬀects.
The eﬃcient labor income tax rate —derived by combining (6a), (6b),
(22a) and (22b)— is given by
τ ∗l =
(Wx−
∼
B)[(1− µ)Uc + µUxTc] + (1− µ)(UcTc − Ux)
∼
E −Ux(Wc−
∼
A)
[(1− µ)(Uc − UxTc)(Wx−
∼
B +
∼
E /Tc)]
0,
(24c)
21Also Guo and Lansing (1999) show that when a common tax rate on capital income and
profits is considered in a real intertemporal optimizing model with imperfect competition,
the optimal tax rate on capital income can be either positive or negative.
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where
∼
A,
∼
B and
∼
E are combinations of parameters.22 The existence of posi-
tive profits, that can be either taxed or untaxed, has no substantial implica-
tions for the optimal labor tax rate, which is plausibly positive. ?
These results are to be ascribed to the good market imperfections, which
imply that positive profits appear in the intertemporal budget constraint of
consumers. Since Π and Tc are elements of the pseudo-welfare function of the
social planner —by means of the implementability constraint (20)— Tcm < 0
enters directly the first-order condition of the Ramsey problem for m, thus
invalidating the Friedman ”full liquidity” rule.23
These findings generalize and extend the result of Schmitt-Grohè and
Uribe (2004a) by showing that the zero inflation tax may be optimal also
when profit taxation is non-confiscatory. Here, what is new (in addition
to the endogeneity of capital and the use of capital taxation), and to some
extent surprising, is that the Friedman rule is valid if capital and profits are
taxed at the same rate (α = 1). In order to be satisfied, the ”full liquidity
rule” needs a flexible choice of the tax instrument on profits and capital.
Notice that the violation of the Friedman rule is satisfied when both the
hypotheses α < 1 and Π > 0 (i.e., µ > 0) hold. In this case, the inflation
tax constitutes an indirect way of taxing profits. The optimal taxation of
profits at the same rate as capital income (i.e., α = 1) or at a confiscatory
rate (i.e., α =
1
τk
) results in the validity of the zero inflation tax result; the
same result is true when profits (i.e., µ = 0) are absent. If instead µ = 0 and
hence Π = 0, the burden of taxation is born by labor taxation alone, since
i∗ = 0 and τ ∗k = 0.
Once again, the analysis conducted in this section demonstrates that
the crucial factor for the invalidity of the Friedman rule is the existence of
restrictions on the set of fiscal instruments that can be optimally used. Now
the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) principle has become invalid because of
positive profits as shown by Stiglitz and Dasgupta (1971).
22They are given by the expressions:
∼
A= ∆(Ucc−UxTcc−TcUxc);
∼
B= ∆(Ucx−TcUxx);
and
∼
E= Ωξ(1− τk)(1− µ)FklTc.
23This observation has some parallelism with the methodological remarks on the zero
capital tax rule put forward by Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997, p. 105-06).
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With regard to the mechanics of the results, we can observe that the
existence of monopolistic profits that are not optimally taxed or not taxed at
the same rate as capital implies a change in the way in which the transaction
costs technology and its derivatives (i.e., the ultimate cause of the Friedman
rule validity) enter the implementability constraint.
4 Perfect competition and taxation of prof-
its/rents
In this section, we show that the Friedman rule is invalid if decreasing returns
to scale in the reproducible inputs are considered in monetary models with
perfect competition and a homogeneous transactions technology.
4.1 An economy with productive public goods
Consider a perfectly competitive monetary economy in which the government
spends for a productive public good, g, that cannot be sold to firms. Produc-
tive public spending, which is exogenosuly given, is financed through distor-
tionary taxes on money and factor incomes. Suppose —as in Jones, Manuelli
and Rossi (1993)— that the production function —that is, y = F (k, l, g)— is
linearly homogeneous in capital, labor and g. The presence of the productive
public good implies that there are positive profits, given by Π = gFg.24
Profits enter the intertemporal budget constraint of consumers. Let us
suppose that profits are either untaxed or taxed at the same rate as capital
income. Therefore, the consumer intertemporal budget constraint is still
given by (19), when Π = gFg.
The optimal tax structure is described by
Proposition 3 In an immortal monetary model of capital accumulation with
productive government spending —that cannot be sold to firms— and decreasing
24In the technological hypotheses considered here, the optimal capital tax rate diﬀers
from zero as shown by Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993). If F (k, l, g) were homogeneous
of degree one in k and l alone, profits as well as the optimal tax rate on capital income
would be zero; see Judd (1999).
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returns to scale with respect to the reproducible inputs, second-best eﬃciency
prescribes positive taxation of money and labor. Capital can be taxed or
subsidized or left tax free depending on whether capital and productive public
spending are complementary or substitutable or independent.
Proof. The Ramsey problem is given by (21) with µ = 0 in (21c) and
Π = gFg in the pesudo-welfare function of the social planner. Therefore,
(22) and (23) characterize the Ramsey plan if µ = 0, Π = gFg and Πj = gFgj
for j = k, l.
The optimal inflation tax is still given by (24a).25 Thus, once again, the
Friedman rule is nonoptimal if profits and income from capital are taxed
diﬀerently (α = 0). Otherwise, an equal tax treatment of capital and profits
(α = 1) results in the optimality of a zero inflation tax.
In the steady state, the optimal capital income tax rate is given by
τ ∗k = −
gΦ(Uc − UxTc)(FkFkg − αFgFkk)
[ΓF 2k + αgΦ(Uc − UxTc)(FkFkg − αFgFkk)]
. (25)
If α = 0, capital income should be taxed or subsidized in the long-run
depending on whether capital and productive public spending are Edgeworth
complements or substitutes, i.e. Fgk > 0 or Fgk < 0; the optimal capital
income is zero if k and g are strongly separable. If α = 1, τ ∗k depends on
the sign of the expression FkFkg −FgFkk, which can be either positive (more
likely) or negative (less likely).?
Also this theoretical case confirms that the existence of positive profits
that are untaxed is at the base of the violation of the Friedman rule.
4.2 An economy with a fixed input/asset
Consider a perfectly competitive monetary economy with an exogenously
given input, like, for example, land.
25Note that when profits are tax free (i.e., α = 0), the first-order conditions of the
planner problem are equivalent to those seen in Section 2 if the term zUs in (9) is replaced
by (Uc − UxTc)gFg(k, l, g).
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The production function is given by the constant returns to scale tech-
nology y = F (k, l, z). The demand for land formulated by firms is given by
Fz(k, l, z) = v, where v is the real land reward. Land is inelastically supplied
and fully used in production. Therefore, its total amount can be normalized
to one.
Land is at the same time a factor of production and an asset. If we
denote the price of land in real terms by q, qz will indicate the value of land,
i.e. the amount of nonhuman wealth devoted to land. Assuming that assets
are perfectly substitutable, the following condition must hold under perfect
foresight
r =
v
q
+
.
q
q
.
If this condition is substituted in the consumers’ flow budget constraint,
an intertemporal budget constraint equivalent to (19) is obtained, after inte-
grating forward and imposing no Ponzi games. Profits are now replaced by
land rents, i.e. Π = v(k, l) = Fz(k, l). Two regimes for taxing pure rents are
contemplated: tax exemption of rents and taxation of rents at the same rate
as capital income.
We have that
Proposition 4 In a monetary economy with an inelastically supplied input, the
impossibility to tax pure rents implies the optimality of a positive inflation tax.
If rents are taxed at the same rate as capital income, the optimal inflation
tax is zero. Capital taxation is governed by the Edgeworth complementar-
ity/substitutability relationships between capital and the fixed factor.
Proof. The Ramsey plan is described by (22) and (23) if µ = 0, Π = v = Fz
and Πj = vj = Fzj for j = k, l. The optimal inflation and capital income
taxes are obtained from (24a) and (25), once Π and Fzk are replaced by v
and vk, respectively.26
26When rents are not taxed, the normative analysis of this case can be obtained from
Section 2 if zUs in the implementability constraint (9) is replaced by v(k, l) = Fz.
26
When pure rents are not taxed, the optimality of a positive inflation
tax emerges. If pure rents and capital income are taxed equally, then the
Friedman rule is optimal.
If capital is an Edgeworth complement (substitute) of land, the long-run
capital income tax is positive (negative).?
5 A perfectly competitive economy with ex-
ogenous government transfers
Consider a perfectly competitive monetary economy with infinitely lived
agents and two inputs, labor and capital. Assume that the government dis-
tributes lump-sum transfers —denoted by
∼
n once expressed in terms of the
numeraire— to consumers; these transfers are exogenously given. As these
transfers are not fixed once specified in terms of consumption, the relative
prices (and in particular the nominal interest rate) aﬀect household dispos-
able income through an additional channel that has not been considered
before.
The intertemporal budget constraint of consumers in this two-factor econ-
omy is given by (5) if
∼
n replaces vz, while the implementability constraint is
given by (9) if (Uc − UxTc)
∼
n replaces zUs.
In this case, we have the following normative results
Proposition 5 When exogenous government transfers are considered in a
standard monetary model with a homogeneous transactions technology, the
optimal taxes on money and labor are positive, while the optimal capital in-
come tax is zero.
Proof. It can be easily shown that the Ramsey allocation satifies the fol-
lowing condition for real money balances
Φ[Ux(1− h)Tm+
∼
n UxTcm] = ΓFlTm.
After some algebraic manipulations (carried out with the aid of the social
optimal condition on x), this equation becomes
27
i∗ = −
∼
n ΦUxTcm
(Uc − UxTc)[1 + Φ(ηx + h)]
> 0. (26)
Thus, the optimal inflation tax is diﬀerent from zero if the value of gov-
ernment transfers is non-zero.27
The Ramsey plan also contemplates a zero capital income tax — as the
capital stock does not enter the pseudo-welfare function and there are no
additional constraints — and a positive labor income tax.?
6 Concluding remarks
Since the study of Phelps (1973) the question of the optimal inflation tax
has been investigated by applying Ramsey’s second-best analysis. Phelps
(1973) demonstrates the optimality of collecting revenues from seignorage,
thus invalidating the Friedman (1969) zero inflation tax rule.
By applying the Ramsey approach to dynamic settings, some recent pa-
pers have instead demonstrated, although with some dissonance, the opti-
mality of the Friedman rule in infinite-lived models with distortionary taxes.
Among the dissonant contributions, Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1997) em-
phasize that the validity of the Friedman rule is a matter of functional forms
for tastes and the shopping-time technology, while Schmitt-Grohè and Uribe
(2004a) argue that, when there are product market imperfections, such a rule
is satisfied if and only if monopoly profits are taxed at a confiscatory rate.
In the optimal inflation tax literature developed so far, the considera-
tion of an endogenous capital stock has been quite infrequent, while that of
capital income taxation is totally absent. In this article, on the contrary,
27Note that, with a transactions technology that is homogeneous of any degree in money
balances and consumption, the hypothesis of exogenous government transfers can be func-
tionally assimilated to the case of a non-zero marginal cost of producing money —a way
of undermining the Friedman rule in such a setup, as emphasized by Correia and Teles
(1996, 1999) and De Fiore and Teles (2003). This is because the hypothesis of government
transfers (like the assumption of the positive marginal cost of producing money) makes
de facto the transaction technology non-homogeneous. See Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin
(1997).
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we have adopted a broader perspective by considering capital formation as
well as capital and labor income taxation to explore the proposition that the
optimal inflation tax is zero. In order to eliminate any ambiguity in the inter-
pretation of the results, a monetary setup in which the optimality of a zero
nominal interest rate is satisfied (when the usual assumptions of literature
are considered) has been employed.
We have discovered the existence of a connection between the Friedman
rule and the Chamley-Judd result on the optimality of zero capital income
tax as money and capital taxation have similar theoretical justifications. In
intertemporal optimizing models of capital formation with infinite horizons,
money that facilitates transactions and distortionary factor income taxes,
we have found that the Friedman rule is in general nonoptimal when the
second-best capital tax rate is non-zero.
The paper has demonstrated the optimality of a positive inflation tax
when there are limitations on taxation. These are tax restrictions on pro-
ductive factors, profits in an economy with product market imperfections,
and profits/rents in an economy with perfect competition and decreasing re-
turns to scale in the reproducible inputs.28 With restrictions on taxation of
production factors or profits/rents, the inflation tax represents an indirect
way to tax what cannot be taxed. The nonoptimality of the Friedman rule
derives from the invalidity of the Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) principle on
the prohibition against intermediate goods taxation.
Moreover, we have shown that exogenous transfers distributed by the
government to consumers imply a positive inflation tax; in such a case, the
capital income tax is instead zero.29
From a mechanical standpoint, we have discovered that the optimality of
the Friedman rule in models with shopping-time costs fails when: i) partial
derivatives of the transaction costs technology enter the implementability
constraint and hence the planner pseudo-welfare function; ii) there are ad-
ditional constraints faced by the social planner, that private agents do not
28Monopoly profits can be assimilated to rents since they represent incomes from
monopoly rights, some sort of non-reproducible factors.
29Note that constant government transfers ensure that the optimal human-capital in-
come tax is non-zero in real models of physical and human capital formation. See Jones,
Manuelli and Rossi (1993, 1997).
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face, involving partial derivatives of the transactions technology.30
Finally, another case, that has not been considered in this paper, in which
the joint invalidity of the Friedman and Chamley-Judd rules may occur, is
obtained when there are wealth eﬀects in the optimal consumer choices.31 As
in such a case money and capital appear directly in the maximand function of
the ’Ramsey problem’ through the stock of wealth, the optimal prescriptions
on the zero money and capital income taxation are jointly invalid.
30These conditions are parallel to those established by Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997,
pp. 105-6) for the optimality of the zero capital income tax.
31This case can be obtained, for example, when elastic fertility choices (i.e., endogenous
population growth) are introduced in a neoclassical monetary growth model. Nonhuman
wealth aﬀects fertility choices as the consumer optimum requires that the marginal rate
of substitution of fertility for consumption must equal the opportunity cost of one unit
of fertility; this opportunity cost is given by the marginal product of labor (in terms of
fertility) plus per capita wealth. See, for example, Palivos (1995).
30
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